Critical Discourse Analysis: Some Constructive Criticism
Tyson Vincent, tyson.vincent@biola.edu
In recent years we have heard more and more about critical discourse analysis (CDA) and its use in education (see, e.g., Rogers, 2005). Although many people have set out to critique the flawed practice and conclusions of CDA, very few have targeted their critique at its presuppositions and ethics, or its broader implications as a general ideology. In an admittedly limited way, that is in essence what I aim to do in this article.
Many critics seem to be distracted by the political goals that are claimed to unite CDA, which are noted in the following definition: “the critique of the hegemonic discourses and genres that effect, legitimize, and maintain inequalities, injustices, and oppression in contemporary society” (van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 291). However, I believe there is a failure to recognize that even a goal must be guided by certain ethics and presuppositions, lest participants be divided in achieving it. Though I am aware that proponents of CDA are not a homogeneous group, in this article I offer some constructive criticism for discerning its common underpinnings.
Such a critique is important because it is upon these foundations that all its practice and conclusions are based. Starting points affect endpoints; theory guides practice. Doubtlessly, theoretical flaws are producing methodical ones (Gee, 1999, pp. 5-6). I will not discuss possible objections to CDA’s practices and conclusions, other than to say that many are merely creative descriptions of presuppositions uncritically coloring, or even misplacing, interpretation, because plenty of ink has been devoted to these matters (e.g., Antaki, Billig, Edwards, & Potter, 2003; Burman, 2004; Seidlhofer, 2003; Stubbs, 1997; Widdowson, 1998, 2003a, 2003b, 2004). In CDA, I believe that not merely the analysis but also what precedes it is awry. Moreover, examining the underpinnings will reveal whether CDA is academic study or theoretical speculation (Jones, 2007). All academic fields make foundational truth claims, whether they know it or not, but within CDA critical self-evaluation of its foundation is lacking (Burman, 2004; van Leeuwen, 2006). CDA is a contradictory discipline that lays low its ethics (intentionally or not), assumes its presuppositions, and demands that others cast votes on its faulty conclusions. The result is “under-analysis through taking sides” to enlist “co-sympathizers or co-scolders,” though many may not be able to discern such abstract undergirding presumptions (Antaki et al., 2003, pp. 4-5). Much of CDA has become proselytization toward its own hegemonic worldview, ideology, and discourse, excluding those who cannot pass the threshold of common beliefs about language and the world, eclectic though they are. Below, I deliberate what I perceive to be some of CDA’s most salient ethics and presuppositions, and then I formulate objections to them.
CDA’s Ethics and Presuppositions
1. Though CDA’s origins are Marxist, it retains a moral standard for pinpointing injustice (Seidlhofer, 2003). Proponents of CDA can counteract oppression and aid the oppressed only after diagnosing what standards, ethical or otherwise, are being broken. In essence, it seems to have preserved intuitive remnants of some eclectic moral standard, however tweaked. I believe that CDA’s ethical standard is a partial remnant of humanity’s divinely implanted conscience (see Romans 2:14-16). CDA is a misguided messiah-complex that unintentionally longs for and preempts the true Messiah (Luke 4:17b-18). Proof of deliverance is in what one delivers the oppressed from and to. Though CDA’s desires should be applauded, presently it is a messianic imitation that cannot deliver the oppressed.
2. Language always involves dynamics of power. Though there is biblical precedence for language’s innate power that should inspire future analytical studies (especially in the spiritual realm), the inherent power of language as represented by scripture diverges from CDA’s approach, which more closely resembles a self-appointed linguistic bomb squad that anxiously attempts to dismantle the mal-intent of every speech act (Toolan, 2003). As Clark (2007) stated, CDA “investigates the structures of power that underlie all acts of speech and writing, and is therefore concerned with the politics of language” (p. 137). Gee (1999) noted that language is “always political”; however, this is merely assumed in the first pages of his introduction to CDA theory and methods (p. 1). According to Hammersley (1997, pp. 244-245), CDA “often involves the adoption of a macro-sociological theory in which there are only two parties—the oppressors and the oppressed—and only one relationship between them: dominance.” Indeed language is powerful, but to limit language to this purpose is not just simplistic, but boring! Consider self-talk, worship, poetry, songs, an encouraging word, jokes, short stories—most of which are often harmless, fun, or uplifting, but not necessarily politically loaded, impregnated with power, and dominance-driven.
3. Power is inherently evil. This can be reasonably concluded as a main tenet of CDA. Kress (1996) stated,
The intention has been to bring a system of excessive inequalities of power into crisis by uncovering its workings and effects through the analysis of potential cultural objects—texts—and thereby to help in achieving a more equitable social order. (p. 15)
According to CDA, the inequalities of power are the “evil.” Widdowson (1998) buttressed the idea that it is a moral pursuit:
What is most plainly distinctive about critical discourse analysis . . . is its sense of responsibility and its commitment to social justice. This is linguistics with a conscience and a cause, one which seeks to reveal how language is used and abused in the exercise of power and the suppression of human rights. In a grossly unequal world where the poor and the oppressed are subject to discrimination and exploitation such a cause is obviously a just and urgent one which warrants support. (p. 136, italics mine)
Making moral claims about justice assumes that advocates of CDA have a polarized standard of ethics, whereas calling inequalities of power “unjust” implies that such inequalities are evil.
4. Language is used deterministically. From the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis arose the idea of linguistic determinism and the more moderate form of “linguistic relativism . . . which underlies CDA” (Clark, 2007, p. 144). Sapir’s notion that “once the language habits of a group have been fixed, then its speakers are at their mercy” does not sound much different from “the ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions [of language that] are constrained by social and cultural practices, rather than being a matter of personal choice” (Clark, 2007, pp. 143, 146). CDA’s presupposition is similarly understood by Widdowson (2003b), who qualifies it:
I do not mean to suggest that [people who interact] are free agents to do what they will. They are constrained by established conventions and regulations, and restrictions are set on their initiative. But they are not absolutely controlled by them: there is always room for manoeuvre. That is our salvation. (p. 153)
This very inconsistency has led many to be confused about where CDA actually stands on determinacy versus agency (Stubbs, 1997). Such lack of free will also brings us to another complication. Logically following linguistic determinism is the presupposition that individuals are homogeneous in character: people necessarily speak out of who they inherently are because they are uniform in character. Yet individuals and communities are multidimensional, often holding diverse, if not contradictory views, not to mention divergences from the worldviews of their own cultures or members (Widdowson, 2003b). Widdowson (2003b) rightly stated, “I do not believe that individuals simply act out social roles. . . . To think of individuals as if they were representative of such groups, as tokens of the type, is to deal in stereotypical constructs, well defined social categories”; however, the “concept of . . . homogeneous groups with uniform discursive practices is well suited to [CDA’s] image of the hegemonic struggle” (pp. 153, 163).
5. Knowledge saves the oppressed by exposing the oppressive. CDA is employed to unravel the sources of linguistic inequality “to show how [it] is done, . . . to spread awareness of this aspect of language use in society, and to argue explicitly for change on the basis of its findings” (van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 290). The Marxist theories upon which CDA was founded are ones in which class struggle “is a common and persistent feature of society, rather than a temporary disorder,” during which the upper class wields control by a “set of dominant ideas promulgated by the ruling class, . . . hid[ing] from all other members of society the fact that they are being exploited and oppressed” (Clark, 2007, pp. 138-139). Therefore, disclosure of controlling forces is the only means of emancipating the oppressed lower classes.
Implications
1. If language always involves power, and power is inherently evil, then language is also an evil human faculty. However, things are not evil; the heart is (see Jeremiah 17:9). Scripture actually proposes a high view of anthropology, because the present condition of the human heart only shows how far we have unnaturally strayed from God’s image in us (Genesis 1:26-27). It is good that CDA exposes this divergence between who we are and who we should be, being accounted for by our use of language; it diagnoses our problem. The fact that we use language as a weapon shows our own fallenness, and therefore language’s fallenness.
2. The problem with power is that it needs to shift hands. Nothing inherent in the action of shifting hands can change the presumed nature of power from evil to good. Because language use is inherently a power play, and CDA uses language to gain power, then the discipline is an attempt to tip the scales in its own favor, disarming others’ use of language, to push its own ethics and agendas. At the least, the values war being waged is a statement of their ethics and presuppositions being superior to others’, because there is never an absence of an agenda in a values war, only a matter of which one wields the most power and which ones wish theirs did. Ideally, the best, most accurate worldview should win.
3. If CDA is attempting to gain power (evil ends) through language (evil means), then it too is an evil discipline.
4. Therefore, CDA’s use of evil means (language and power) for the elimination of evil cannot realize its ultimate goal. Evil means and ends would logically make CDA a progressively evil pursuit, advancing more evil without bringing about the good ends that it purports to seek.
5. If people are homogeneous groups of individuals, predestined to use and interpret language in their own evil, discourse-driven ways, then even CDA is not able to overcome its own biases in analyses (see Antaki et al., 2003, p. 5; Stubbs, 1997). If there is no linguistic free will, there is neither culpability, self-reflection, nor capacity for change—all people are victims of themselves. If one assumes that change cannot be accomplished in or by individuals, exposing oppression is self-defeating and cannot achieve CDA’s ultimate aims. Analysts are precluded from being able to definitively or objectively know their subjects’ points of view, so studies are irredeemably destined to be biased analyses and there is an inability for objective self-examination (Widdowson, 2003b, p. 155). However, if CDA hinges on linguistic relativism, then how can the analyst draw definitive conclusions about what is determined by an individual’s ideology?
6. Knowledge saves the oppressed by exposing the language of the oppressive. Herein, the discreteness of the oppressor’s presuppositions perpetuates power dynamics in relationships (Clark, 2007). However, often evil persists despite being exposed, showing that knowledge is not the only means of, nor does it result necessarily result in, action. Only the proper use of knowledge (in action) equates with wisdom or brings deep change. Also, knowledge may in fact cause greater oppression, suggested Clark and Ivanic (1997):
Raising awareness of the empowering and disempowering characteristics of discourses can have the opposite of the intended effect, giving people tools with which to linguistically abuse or oppress others. (p. 224)
At most, revealing oppressive uses of language only temporarily disarms an opponent.
So, can CDA be redeemed?
Some common opinions are that CDA “seems to function as an umbrella for any approach that wishes to portray itself as politically radical without being exclusive in its commitments . . . what could legitimately shelter under this umbrella is very diverse” (Hammersley, 1997, p. 244). Also, according to Fairclough (2003), “a CDA of the right is quite conceivable, directed for instance at left-wing or feminist texts” (p. 148). Various approaches may be conceivable, but I think they are lacking because CDA’s faulty underpinnings debar objectors from participation in this discipline (unless they are attempting to beat CDA at its own game), because working within such grids becomes counterintuitive and counterproductive.
People second-naturedly live out their presuppositions of the world. Unfortunately and ironically, CDA’s starting points have become self-fulfilling endpoints, thus pointing out and condemning its own faults in others (see Matthew 7:1-5; Hellerman, 2001, pp. 216-221), guiding it (somewhat deterministically) to view people (and itself) as monolithic without the ability to self-examine or change; constantly abuse language for the purposes of political power; grope for power in the hopes that its nature can be changed; attain and proclaim knowledge in hopes that it will save; and accuse others of veiling their own intents and presuppositions without seeking confirmation that should govern analysis.
As I see it, the options left for CDA advocates are to own up to the implications of its underpinnings and alter them, which would be preferable and would promote dialogue with researchers who cannot (and should not have to) constrain or conform their analysis accordingly. The only other option I see is to reveal such disguised presuppositions and ethics outright before such an analysis begins.
Judeo-Christian Underpinnings
Below I propose what I believe are constructive ethics and presuppositions based on biblical views of morality, language, power, free agency, identity, and salvation, in contrast to those I have criticized within CDA above.
1. Evil is what fails to morally harmonize with the nature of the Judeo-Christian God.
2. Language is inherently neutral; it can be used to bless or to curse but is not limited to these two functions. Justice must be done to its creative functions and abilities. As a result of the fall, language must be transformed from use to use that is or can be redeemed. It is fatalistically viewed as beyond grace and redemption only because human nature is also seen this way.
3. Power is inherently neutral; it can be used for good or misused for evil. Political authorities are God-ordained, whether evil or not, but superseded by God’s moral standard (Romans 13).
4. All people exercise free will, especially in their use of language, as a gift from God. People do not merely speak in deterministic conformity to who they are individualistically or corporately. Humanity’s mangled nature can be progressively unbent, restored, and redeemed, resulting in edifying language through positive linguistic relativism—a fascinating future study (Ezekiel 11:19; 36:26; Russell, 1994).
5. Identity is complex, is multifaceted, and can be chosen to some extent.
6. Knowledge does not save and education alone does not transform humanity. A saving knowledge of Jesus Christ is the only hope of emancipating and redeeming humanity and, by extension, language. CDA’s theory of knowledge saving rather than saving knowledge cannot be reformed without the realization that it is not a lack of the former that is keeping people from oppression, manipulation, and evil. In essence, the heart of the matter is a matter of the heart.
Without a diagnosis of sin as the real problem, the longing for a true messiah will never end. Despite whether language is used according to linguistic determinism or relativism, the transformation of human nature is the only hope of emancipation for the oppressed and the oppressor. Without a Messiah to enact change, humanity is surely doomed to tyranny and oppression. Yet how can CDA recognize this if the nature of language is such that it can convey only oppression and tyranny, and not also good news?
Tyson Vincent has a BA in Applied Linguistics from Moody Bible Institute and is completing MA degrees in Applied Linguistics and in Bible Exposition at Biola University in La Mirada, California. In his free time he likes to draw, paint, play the guitar, surf, and spend time with his lovely wife. He would like to thank Jennifer Vincent and Christine Thompson for their gracious support and encouragement.
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